Beijing’s loudest voices are not Beijing’s
Cet article est disponible en anglais uniquement.

Fifteen weeks, 155,000 posts
Between 31 July and 15 November 2026, we followed 209 accounts that speak for the People’s Republic of China, or sound a great deal like it. There were 55 state-media outlets and commentators; 129 embassies, consulates, missions and spokespeople; and 25 personal accounts we assess as closely aligned with Beijing. Together they published 155,642 posts and drew 6.6 million interactions.
The influencers’ weekly return swings with events; state media’s stays in a narrow band
- State media
- Diplomats and officials
- Aligned influencers
- aWeek of 10 AugThe 15 August surrender anniversary
- bWeek of 31 AugSCO summit in Bishkek; Xi Jinping’s state visit to Cairo
- cWeek of 7 SepBRICS summit in New Delhi
- dWeek of 21 SepXi’s state visit to Washington
- eWeek of 28 SepNational Day
- fWeek of 26 OctBrazil’s runoff, Mbappé’s Mao remark, the party plenum
- gWeek of 9 NovJensen Huang leaves Nvidia; the APEC run-up
The state does most of the talking. A small ring of personal accounts gets most of the reaction. And what those accounts say often differs, in tone and in target, from what Beijing says in its own name.
The megaphone and the outriders
State media published 82% of the posts we collected and drew 22% of the interactions. The 25 aligned influencers published under 2% of the posts and drew 56%. Even without the single most-engaged post in the set, their share stays above half.
The megaphone gets seen. The outriders get the reaction.
Share of posts
Share of views
Share of interactions
12average interactions on a post by state media (55 accounts, 128,332 posts)
60average interactions on a post by diplomats and officials (129 accounts, 24,630 posts)
1,373average interactions on a post by aligned influencers (25 accounts, 2,680 posts)
- State media
- Diplomats and officials
- Aligned influencers
The gap is widest at the bottom of the state machine. CGTN’s seven regional and language feeds produced half of every post we collected and 1.4% of the reaction. More than half of their posts drew no interaction at all, and fewer than one in ten mentioned China.
When state media does travel, it is rarely with the line. Shanghai Daily’s post about a theme-park mascot reporting for work in a typhoon drew 43,684 interactions. That is nine times the total for all 386 posts we found on the Communist Party’s autumn plenum.
Ten accounts hold 64% of all interactions on 6% of the posts. Six are influencers. Two are diplomatic: the foreign ministry spokesperson Mao Ning and the embassy in Tokyo. Only two are outlets.
The more an account posts, the less each post earns
- State media
- Diplomats and officials
- Aligned influencers
Beijing’s publishing operation is easy to count and easy to overrate. The audience sits with personal accounts the state does not formally own, and can disown.
Set pieces and fights
Beijing’s autumn calendar was full: the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit in Bishkek, Xi Jinping’s state visits to Cairo and Washington, the BRICS summit in New Delhi, National Day, the Long March anniversary, the party plenum, two trade fairs and the run-up to APEC in Shenzhen. These eleven set pieces produced 9,321 posts at an average of 33 interactions each. Five fights nobody scheduled produced 2,100 posts at 248 each.
The set pieces got the posts. The fights got the audience.
Scheduled set pieces · 9,321 posts, 33 interactions each
- BRICS summit, New Delhi99780,917
- Xi’s state visit to Washington1,19862,568
- National Day, 1 October1,48658,396
- APEC run-up, Shenzhen1,03725,454
- Xi’s state visit to Egypt38118,918
- Long March 90th anniversary87415,619
- SCO summit, Bishkek82614,490
- Humanoid robot games54011,085
- Shanghai import expo1,1668,087
- Canton Fair4304,677
- Party plenum3864,639
Fights nobody scheduled · 2,100 posts, 248 interactions each
- Posts on the Takaichi government518210,379
- Brazil’s runoff and the “rigged” claim1,119154,615
- Online brawl with Turkish users6665,283
- Jensen Huang “spy” story28547,233
- Mbappé’s Mao remark11243,901
- Posts published
- Interactions earned
The biggest was Brazil. Lula won the 25 October runoff, and President Trump suggested without evidence that the result was rigged. Beijing congratulated Lula through official channels. Its outriders went further: an influencer who recast the foreign ministry’s position as a taunt at Washington drew 67,321 interactions, the most of the episode. Posts on Brazil’s result out-drew posts on Xi’s state visit to Washington by 2.5 to 1, on a similar number of posts.
The same held for the backlash after Kylian Mbappé referred to Mao as a dictator, for the allegations that Jensen Huang had a relationship with a suspected Chinese spy before he left Nvidia, and for a week-long online brawl between Chinese and Turkish users. The fifth fight, over Japan’s prime minister, comes next.
Beijing plans its calendar a year ahead. Its best weeks online were handed to it by someone else’s misstep.
Japan, in Japanese
Japan appears in 2.9% of the posts and 11.3% of the interactions, about four times the average return per post. Among subjects abroad, only India comes near that rate.
Japan’s share of interactions sits above its share of posts in every week
- Share of interactions
- Share of posts
The official line is history. War memory frames 41% of Japan posts: the 81st anniversary of the surrender, the Tokyo Trial, Yasukuni Shrine, Unit 731. Embassy and consulate accounts post in Japanese. They pair the anniversaries with warnings about Tokyo’s defence build-up and with the trial of the Self-Defense Forces officer who entered the Chinese embassy with a knife in March.
What lands is something else. The most-engaged voice on Japan in our set is a Japanese-language account with about 4,500 followers, which we track as suspected of alignment with Beijing. It drew twice the interactions the Chinese embassy earned on Japan. Three in four of its posts never mention China. They go after Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi instead: her government’s flood response, subsidy cuts, her handling of parliament.
Takaichi is named in 12% of Japan posts and 28% of Japan interactions, 84% of it from the influencer tier. The official account indicts Japan’s past. The posts that travel indict its prime minister’s present, in her own voters’ language.
History supplies the volume; Takaichi supplies the reaction
- War history
- Rearmament
- Takaichi and her government
- Taiwan
- Nuclear issues
- Share of Japan posts
- Share of Japan interactions
We have not established coordination between that account and Chinese officials. That needs network and timing analysis we have not yet done.
Handshake and grievance
On posts mentioning both China and the United States, diplomats used cooperative language in 48% and hostile language in 10%. The influencers reversed it: 36% hostile, 14% cooperative. In the week Xi was at the White House, cooperative language in official and state-media posts nearly doubled, to 64%.
Same subject, opposite register
- Hostile language
- Cooperative language
The two registers often ran on the same day. On 24 September, Mao Ning announced Xi’s invitation for 100,000 young Americans to study in China. The same day, one prominent influencer explained that Xi’s Iowan host family “are real America not the Epstein regime ruling in Washington”.
Official warmth towards Washington peaked with the state visit
- Cooperative language
- Hostile language
India showed the same split, over a period that included the BRICS summit in New Delhi. Partnership posts earned 81% of the diplomats’ India interactions. Posts belittling India, its cities and its people earned 49% of the influencers’; the most-engaged was a one-line slur.
On India, the diplomats’ audience rewards partnership; the influencers’ rewards contempt
- Derogatory posts
- Partnership posts
One account has made a format of the gap. It rewrites foreign ministry statements as taunts under the headers “China responds” and “Translation”. Those posts average 2,995 interactions. The ministry spokesperson’s own account averages 366, with fifteen times the followers.
The state gets the handshake; the outriders keep the grievance warm. Whether that division of labour is designed, tolerated or simply exploited is the question worth asking next.
The Middle East, relayed
The Middle East fills 15.7% of all posts, more than any foreign subject except the United States, and returns 4.6% of the interactions. State media ran 23,493 posts on the region at 3.4 interactions each. Only 4.5% of them mention China; on the Iran war, the figure is 2.4%.
The Middle East gets one post in six and one interaction in twenty
- United States
- Middle East
- Europe
- Russia and Ukraine
- Latin America
- Africa
- Japan
- India
- Taiwan
- Korean peninsula
- Share of all posts
- Share of all interactions
CGTN’s Arabic feed has about 650,000 followers and averages 1.8 interactions per post. Its best performers are human-interest clips from China, not regional news.
Beijing speaks in its own name in three places: Xi’s state visit to Cairo, his four principles on Palestine, and objections to US sanctions on Iran. The influencers use Gaza and Israel differently, mostly as evidence against the West, at more than 600 interactions a post. In places they slide into antisemitic tropes about who “controls” America.
China relays the region’s news at industrial volume and adds little of its own. The opinions come from accounts it can disown.
Effort and reach
Counting Beijing’s output measures its effort, not its reach. The reach sits with a few dozen accounts whose tone is harsher, whose targets are more local, and whose links to the state are harder to prove.
How we measured. 155,642 posts from 209 accounts, 31 July to 15 November 2026 (UTC); about 19,100 rows from unrelated accounts were excluded. Interactions are likes, shares, comments and quotes. The 25 influencers are assessed as aligned with Beijing, not shown to be directed by it. Topics and tone were flagged by keyword rules across original text and machine translation, so tone figures are indicative and topics overlap. Influencer accounts appear under-collected, which makes their share a floor. We make no claim of coordination here.